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We are, collectively, still struggling to come to terms with Hallyu, Korean Wave. This 
is seen in the multitude of contrasting perspectives that have been applied by 
journalists and academics alike since the turn of the new millennium. There is a lack 
of consensus, and perspectives run from fear and criticism by what Cho Hae-joang 
calls the postcolonial camp, through pride and celebration in what is happening 
(Cho’s nationalist camp), to economic planning (the neoliberal camp; Cho Hae-joang 
2005).1 The three camps seem to trend chronologically in the order given here,2 but 
are no longer sufficient now that Korean Wave has spread to the world beyond Asia. 
Indeed, recent foreign commentaries about the economy of Korean Wave have 
diverged, often markedly, from Korean accounts of its global popularity. New models 
are needed, one of which, Ingyu Oh and Gil-Sung Park’s supply chain model (2012), 
seems to have considerable utility.3 Their theory throws out existing, albeit dated, 
accounts of the music industry, and demonstrates how the internationalization of 
Korean Wave moves the industry from a fan-oriented service business (B2C) to 
business servicing (B2B). Our accounts do, though, agree on key moments in Korean 
Wave: 1999, when the term, hallyu, began to be used; 2003 when “Winter Sonata” 
reached Japan; 2008 or shortly after when Korean pop again moved into a global 
frame; and 2012 as the date when Psy conquered YouTube.  
 Whatever our perspective, though, let us start with a celebration: a celebration 
of those in the cultural industries who in recent years have made Korea cool. During 
the more than 30 years of my involvement with Korean Studies, I have always 
struggled to counter the abiding images of Korea held in Europe and America: images 
of poverty and destruction in the Korean War that are still perpetuated by repeated 
broadcasts of MASH, images of a bellicose and threatening North, images of student 
demonstrations and striking workers, and, in terms of industry, images of cars, 
computers and mobile phones considered slightly inferior to those made in Japan. 
This, bluntly, is no longer the case. Korean Wave is so fashionable that its coolness 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  The three camps are also discussed by Keehyeung Lee (2008: 180–88), referencing an 
earlier article by Cho (2002) and a paper by W. Paik (2005). 
2  The three camps all remain, as interviewees in KBS World’s 2013 documentary, “Hallyu 
taejŏnhwan/The Great Transformation of Korean Wave”, illustrate. Documentary 
available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnmvHf9kIv4&list=PLMf7VY8La5RHUiqsrzlNX2O9
hD0YOwu_I&index=3 (accessed 5 October 2013). I thank Anna Yates for alerting me to 
this, which appears in her forthcoming paper, “The Korean Wave in Britain”. 
3  In some ways, this model corresponds to discussions of branding that have featured in a 
number of conference presentations in recent years; see, e.g., Eunkyoung Han, Woosung 
Chang and Gabshin Hwang 2008. 
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has transferred to Korean industrial production, to the products of Samsung, LG, 
Hyundai, Kia and more, much as if the “Cool Britannia” of 15 years ago in my 
country is being repeated – but hopefully in a more successful manner – here in Korea. 
And, as Korea has become cool, so universities around the globe have seen increases 
in student demand for Korea-related courses. So, as a university professor, I have to 
start this presentation with a “thank you” for Korean Wave.  
 
 Increasingly, the beginnings of Korean Wave are situated within our accounts 
by the arrival of the term, hallyu, linking to Korean exports to China – where the term 
originated – and Taiwan. They link to the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, a 
time when it is said that the devaluation of the Korean wŏn made Korean cultural 
products affordable across the region. However, the ability of Korea’s cultural 
producers to take advantage of the opportunities that suddenly appeared was 
facilitated because they were primed and ready to do so. They were prepared because 
consumption and production had changed in the early 1990s, making Korea’s 
recorded music industry, for example, the second largest in Asia. In this paper, then, I 
am going to track back in time, to explore the foundations of Korean Wave in terms 
of the seismic shifts that hit Korea’s cultural production around 1990. This was the 
period when democracy bedded in, and when Korea took its place on the international 
stage. Commentaries outside Korea on Korean cultural production, though, proved 
slow to notice any change and, until very recently, have been inadequate, perhaps 
because the peninsula long remained on the periphery of global consciousness.  
 Indeed, my edited volume, Korean Pop Music: Riding the Wave (2006), was 
the first book-length consideration of Korean pop in English. I noted in its 
introduction that my inspiration was a feeling of inequity. Until then, international 
academia, at least in publications, had hardly noticed the vibrancy and importance of 
Korean Wave. For example, the accounts of Korean pop in standard works such as 
World Music: The Rough Guide were inadequate; Hideo Kawakami and Paul Fisher, 
in the first edition – still widely in circulation – told us that Korea had “developed 
economically at a staggering pace, but in terms of popular music there [was] nothing 
to match the remarkable contemporary sounds of Indonesia, Okinawa, or Japan” 
(1994: 470). Okon Hwang provided a more balanced account in the second edition of 
World Music: The Rough Guide, and for the most recent incarnation of the New 
Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, but only in the form of brief accounts that 
stopped before the 1990s (2000: 164—5; 2001: 814—5 and 818). John Lent’s Asian 
Popular Culture (1995) omitted Korea altogether, while Allen Chun, Ned Rossiter 
and Brian Shoesmith’s Refashioning Pop Music in Asia (2004) claimed to include 
Korea but did so only in respect to a Korean singer of enka, the colonial-era-
originating genre, active in Japan. I had written a chapter in Tim Craig and Richard 
King’s edited volume, Global Goes Local: Popular Culture in Asia (2002), but in the 
book this was swamped by the many accounts of Japan, China, India and elsewhere.  
 Korean Studies specialists, in the main concerned with language, literature and 
history, also largely failed to notice the emergence of Korean Wave. My first 
academic paper devoted to Korean pop, given at a 1999 conference of the Association 
of Korean Studies in Europe held in Hamburg, was greeted as heretical by some 
established Koreanists: hip hop, reggae and rap were not Korean, they chimed. More 
recently, Koichi Iwabuchi’s discussions of cultural flows, transnationalism, and 
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glocalization in East Asia (2002, 2004) begin with Japan not Korea. Our library 
shelves still stock many more academic articles and books that discuss J-pop and 
Chinese pop (albeit underground and rock rather than mainstream Chinese pop) than 
K-pop. In fact, when researching this paper, typing “Korean Wave” into the massive 
e-publication database EBSCOHost returned just 77 results.4 And, although Korean 
Pop Music: Riding the Wave is now out of print, apart from Mark Russell’s 
impressionistic and journalistic Pop Goes Korea (2008), about the only other book-
length treatment of pop has been Sun Jung’s discussion of masculinity in K-pop idols 
(2011).5 But, for the moment, I must resist reprinting Korean Pop Music. It needs 
thorough updating, since today’s K-pop, and Korean Wave more generally, is 
remarkably different to what existed when we first published in 2006.  
If this relative lack of publications suggests an egregious academic oversight, 
it is worth stating that until the 1990s Korea had not joined the “polylateral” (George 
Lipsitz 1994; Timothy Taylor 1997; Rebekah Moore 2004) or “transregional” (Mark 
Slobin 1993). Hence, it was not easily observable by scholars outside the country. The 
first of these terms, polylateral, and its absence in Korea, suggests a fear of 
contamination arising from the nationalism fostered during the Park Chung Hee and 
Chun Doo Whan regimes. The absence of the polylateral was, though, as much part of 
the protection of small local industries under the state’s export substitution model.  
These small companies licensed products from international music “majors”, 6 
repackaging and distributing them, but were happy to keep those same “majors” at a 
distance, limiting their investment in and influence on Korea. Bans on Japanese 
cultural products remained in force until 1999 or later,7 and in the 1990s when Korean 
cultural production was still designed for local audiences it was not uncommon for 
claims to be made that K-pop inappropriately copied foreign songs.8  It is not 
surprising that in the new millennium, but not in the 1990s, the concept behind the 
term “transregional” has become core to many accounts of Korean Wave. Accounts9 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  Search narrowed to publications in art, music, and media and communication; some of my 
own writing included in this total number. 
5  This is not to discount a large number of articles by, amongst others, Shin Hyunjoon, 
Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, Roald Maliangkay and more. 
6  Today, the three remaining “majors” are Universal Music Group, Sony Music 
Entertainment and Warner Music Group. 
7  A ban may have technically been in force, but many Korean musicians recorded in Japan, 
often with Japanese musicians, and, as I indicate below, Korean satellite dishes picked up 
Japanese broadcasts long before they were legally allowed to. Bans on Japanese manga 
and some films were lifted from the beginning of 1999, music was allowed in small 
venues from September and anywhere from June 2000, and all Japanese films were 
allowed from January 2004, although terrestrial broadcasters were still banned from 
carrying Japanese music and television dramas. 
8  Seo Taiji’s “Come Back Home” (1995) has been claimed by some to be based on Cypress 
Hill’s Black Sunday album (1993), Roo’ra’s “Ch’ŏnsang yuae” (1996) openly but without 
attribution sampled a Japanese track, and Shinhwa has been said, in its many changes of 
image, try to emulate bands such as NSync and Backstreet Boys – but, then, as Korea’s 
longest-lasting boy band, they have been covered by others, including the Taiwanese 
groups Energy and 5566 (“Hey, Come on!” and “Dark”, respectively). 
9  Note that this paper primarily explores texts written in English. I look forward to having 
the opportunity to explore additional Korean-language sources. 
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have taken as their central focus the spread of Korean Wave abroad to, for example, 
the East Asian region as a whole (Doobo Shin 2006, Chua and Iwabuchi 2008, 
Sujeong Kim 2009, Younghan Cho 2011), around the globe (Woongjae Ryoo 2009, 
Shin Hyunjoon 2009 and 2011, David Bevan 2012, Sarah Leung 2012) or, considered 
more narrowly, China (Li Sheng 2007), Japan (Eun-Young Jung 2009), Taiwan (Sang 
Yeon Sung 2008 and 2010, Shuling Huang 2011), Hong Kong (Lisa Leung 2009), 
Singapore (Kelly Fu Sun Yin and Kai Khlun Liew 2005, Brenda Chan and Wang 
Xueli 2011), and so on. These broaden from the theoretical frame of the transregional 
to typically refer to transnationalism, hybridity, cosmopolitanism, commodification 
and consumption, and cultural flows – each of these terms referencing theoretical 
positions that will doubtless characterize discussions at this conference.  
We might apply some of these same theoretical positions to Korea in the early 
1990s. It would, however, be a mistake to see the development of Korean Wave prior 
to its transregional export as a matter of “Westernizing Asia” (to cite Bevan 2012); 
“catch-up” would be a better expression for what happened. During the first decade of 
my personal engagement with Korea, the 1980s, I found little that was remarkable in 
Korean pop music, films, or dramas. Pop, with its focus on ballads – then a recent 
term, but in style and content not much changed since the 1960s – seemed little 
different to Cantopop or Singapop, or for that matter, to the standard fare of the 
Eurovision Song Contest.10 During the 1980s, Korea’s pop stars were framed and 
controlled by television and radio, singing songs written by others to the 
accompaniment of studio bands, all too often filmed standing motionless in bland 
studios. Covering all cultural production, a large body of legislation ensured control: 
the Publishing and Printing Regulation Act (1961), Screen Arts Promotion Act (1966), 
Child Protection Law (1966), Customs Law (1967), Law on Recorded Sound (1971), 
Culture and Arts Promotion Act (1972), Overseas Publication Import and Distribution 
Act (1973), and so on. This legislation was interpreted in its vagaries by various 
bodies and ministries, and to an extent it was self-policed by production companies, 
since the memories of Chun Doo Whan’s crackdown on the media as he assumed the 
presidency in 1980 were still fresh in the minds of company managers and 
broadcasting executives.11  
March 1992 saw the transformation of Korean pop begin: famously, this was 
when Seo Taiji and Boys burst onto TV screens. During 1992, four of the band’s 
tracks pushed into the charts: “Nan arayo/I Know”, “Ijaenŭn/Now”, “Hwangsangsok 
ŭi kŭdae/You in Your Dreams” and “Ibami kip’ŏgajiman/This Night, is Deep, But”. 
Seo Taiji brought rap to Koreans, but he also introduced a new concept of star based 
on image, an image controlled by the group rather than the studio, an image that was 
not reliant on a studio band, backing dancers, and a broadcaster’s hierarchy of writers 
and arrangers. The standard way to theorize what Seo Taiji achieved is to cite Arjun 
Appadurai (e.g. 1990: 1–14, 1996), and concepts of imaging embraced by the terms 
“ideoscape” and “technoscape”. These are framed within “deterritorialization”, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  I acknowledge a personal bias at this point; I am not a fan of the Eurovision Song Contest, 
but note that for inexplicable reasons some other musicologists and ethnomusicologists are 
(e.g., Bohlman 2004 and 2010, Raykoff and Tobin 2007, Fricker and Gluhovic 2013). 
11  Chun closed down TBS along with many journals (including the cultural magazine, Ppuri 
kip’ŭn namu). 
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reflection on the decline of state sovereignty that in this era allowed cultural 
production to override the control enshrined by broad-ranging legislation.  
In quick succession, a veritable explosion of pop followed as many more 
foreign styles were appropriated: reggae became hip hop starting with Kim Gun Mo’s 
“P’inggye/Excuse”, interpretations of house and rave started with Noise, rap met 
reggae in Roo’ra’s “Roots of Reggae”, and jungle arrived in the strangely literal 
interpretation of Park Mi Kyung’s “Ebŭi ŭi kyŏnggo/Eve’s Warning”. The heavy 
metal heard on Seo Taiji’s third album (1994) had actually long been part of the 
underground with groups such as Shinawi, Sanullim and Baekdoosan, and had 
morphed into the mainstream not least with Shin Hae Chul’s NEXT (“New 
Experimental Team”).12 It is, of course, debatable whether one can tie a specific pop 
style’s appropriation or introduction in Korea to one artist or group, and although my 
assignments here may appear reasonable I note that Seo Taiji merely performed the 
first rap on terrestrial Korean television – others had already experimented with rap in 
the studio – and, also, that none of the new appropriations would dislodge ballad’s 
persistence as a mainstay of the music scene.13  
Appropriation is often criticized as rootless fusion and pastiche;14 it assumes a 
postcolonial mentality, in which in this case new Korean pop could be seen as “the 
embodiment of the West penetrating our bodies” (Seung-mi Han et al 2002, cited in 
Cho Hae-joang 2005: 163).  This, however, sits uncomfortably with Aristotle’s notion 
of the mimetic, at least when the mimetic is granted the potential to be subversive in 
the writings of, say, Jacques Derrida (1978) and Michael Taussig (1993). When 
produced reflectively and with differentiation, the appropriated styles challenge 
Appadurian perspectives. Hence, as Korean Wave has taken root, it has become 
commonplace to position discussions by referencing “glocalization” (after, e.g., 
Iwabuchi 2002, Parks and Kumar 2002 passim) and “reterritorialization” (after 
Tomlinson 1999). These, when applied to East Asia generally or Korea more 
specifically, fuse the postcolonial and nationalist camps by arguing for a non-Western 
modernity founded on regional difference. They challenge Western cultural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  Albums referred to in this paragraph include: “Seo Taiji wa aidŭl” (Bando BDCD-014, 
1992), “Seo Taiji and Boys III” (Bando, BDCD-023, 1994), “Kim Kŏnmo 2” (Dukyun 
DYCD-7016, 1993), “Roots of Reggae: Roo’ra” (Daewoo DWP CP-0007, 1994), “Roo’ra 
2nd” (World Music WMCD-1007, 1995), “Park Mi Kyung No. 2nd” (Line LC-1002, 1995), 
“Noise” (Dukyun DYCD-7011, 1993), “NEXT: Home” (Jigu JCDS-0317, 1992).  
13  It can be argued that scholars tend to ignore the persistent popularity of ballads in East 
Asia. This seems particularly the case in studies of Chinese pop (see, for example, 
Baranovitch 2003, Fung 2008, Barmé 2009, De Kloet 2010), although an exception in 
respect to Korea is Eun-Young Jung (2011).  
14  Similar criticisms are widespread, so although they may at root appear to be in harmony 
with Appadurai’s observations, they will today be frequently heard in respect to the global 
phenomenon of every aspiring singer having a chance at fame in Pop Idol, X Factor, and 
their many variants. Indeed, Simon Frith remarked that by the 1980s in British pop it was 
“no longer possible to make a startling rock statement, and the perceived post-modern 
condition of fragmentation and breakdown of master narratives [had] led to recyclings and 
pastiches” (Frith 1987). That, of course, was before the made-for-measure boy band and 
girl band became such common currency. As a theoretical position, the criticism can be 
traced back to Adorno and the Frankfurt school in the 1940s (see, e.g., Adorno 1972, 
1976).  
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hegemony (after Cho Uhn 2005: 144) and promote an Asian global. Although such 
approaches are intrinsically political (after Marwan Kraidy 2005: 16), we now have, 
for example, accounts of rap that contrast America and Asia, detailing how sonic 
similarities mask structural differences that became necessary as lyrics moved from 
American/English to Asian languages (e.g., Manabe 2006). Or, accounts of how rock 
and hip hop have incorporated localized identities (e.g., Huang 2001, 2003; Fung 
2008). We might also note how lyricism was introduced as a foil to rap in, say, 
Roo’ra’s “Ch’in’gurŭl ponaemyŏ/Sending Friends on their Way” (1995). Non-
Western modernity was able to remove the youth rebellion inherent in global pop, 
mainstreaming sub-cultures by abandoning the cultural baggage that they carried and 
ascribing to Asian family values. And so, at least in early 1990s, Korean pop retained 
the anodyne lyrics of earlier ballads, rather than adopting American street culture. 
Consider the lyrics to Seo Taiji’s “Nan arayo/I Know”:  
I know it as a fact that when tonight is over someone has to leave. I’ve come 
to realize why this is so. 
I didn’t manage to tell her that I loved her. Anyway, it’s too late now. What 
was I doing? Her smile was so beautiful. 
Or Kim Gun Mo’s “P’inggye/Excuse”: 
Even now you’re giving me that silly excuse, with that hard-to-believe story. 
Don’t give me that excuse. Put yourself in my shoes, just think about it, could 
you laugh now if you were me? 
You just brought it up, as if you were joking, or as if you weren’t joking, 
saying you would tell me about being left alone. 
In the letter hidden deep inside the bouquet of flowers, “Goodbye” were the 
only two characters deeply engraved. 
These are hardly rap and reggae in the Euro-American pop tradition. 
 Where appropriation is criticized in Korean Wave, so its products are claimed 
to be “de-Koreanized” (Shin Hyunjoon 2009: 513–5), “culturally odorless” (Sun Jung 
2011: 3), “too white” (Tobias Hübinette 2012: 523) or “trapped” as hybrid forms 
between the national and the global (Younghan Cho 2011: 388). These criticisms are 
familiar from discourses on the genre of world music, where commentators offer 
nuanced takes on Said’s Orientalism to challenge Western hegemonic practices (e.g., 
Erlmann 1996, Taylor 2007, Howard 2010, White 2012). However, for Korean Wave 
to succeed requires those who produce it and write about it to challenge the standard 
world systems theories of Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1979) in which that 
hegemony is situated. Hence, as scholars have got to grips with glocalization and 
reterritorialization, so they have argued how East Asia “refashions pop” (Chun, 
Rossiter and Shoesmith 2004), situating it “beyond subculture” (Huq 2006) in 
“critical encounters” with globalization (White 2012).15  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  The works cited here by Huq and White take us beyond East Asia. 
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In the foundation period, the refashioning, and the critical encounters, may not 
be seen. A brief detour to Korean cinema will hopefully illustrate. In 1996, the year 
that Seo Taiji and Boys disbanded, film also remained local in orientation. While 483 
films were imported – 56% from America – only 19 of the 55 Korean domestic films 
shown in local cinemas were exported.16 The total film market remained small, and 
was worth $252 million. Discussions commonly asked how Korean production could 
be improved, and critiqued Hollywood itself, as being unsuitable for local 
consumption (– here, Franco Moretti’s view, that the flashy commercialism of 
Hollywood disperses cultural divides by ignoring people’s individual culture, is 
perhaps pertinent; 2001). However, elements that would be key to the refashioning 
were already in place. First, a tradition had been established for films to contain social 
commentary case within a frame of realism, for which consider Chang Sonu’s 
“Sŏnggong shidae/The age of success” (1988), Pak Chongwŏn’s “Kuro arirang” 
(1989), Pae Yonggyun’s “Talmaga tongchogŭro kan kkadalgŭn?/Why has Bodhi 
Dharma Left for the East” (1989), and Pak Kwangsu’s “Kŭldŭldo uri chŏrŏm/Black 
Republic” (1990). Second, more than 90% of the income generated from film exports 
in 1996 came from the around 20,000 Koreans working in 200 animation companies. 
Bringing these two together offers an explanation for the characteristic juxtapositions 
of super-realism, pop realism and hybridity that became so characteristic of Korean 
Wave film.  
So, as the 1990s dawned, a constellation of factors coalesced to provide the 
foundations for Korean Wave. Simply put, the elements can be summarized as 
follows: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  If time permitted, it would be desirable to look at the export of other cultural production in 
the 1990s. Li Sheng (2007), for example, points out that the first Korean television drama 
was broadcast in China in 1993. 
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  Two critical events had marked the late 1980s. First, the demonstrations 
against the government which came to a head in June 1987 when Roh Tae Woo, as 
the chosen successor to Chun Doo Whan, went on television to announce there would 
be free and fair presidential elections, began the (gradual) shift from dictatorship to 
democracy. This would make the maintenance of strict control through legislation 
impossible. Second, the successful hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
functioned as a coming-of-age for the Republic of Korea, for its government and for 
its people, under the slogan “Seoul to the World, the World to Seoul”. As Korea 
emerged as an important part of the world economy, so it tentatively began to open. It 
allowed a greater freedom for Koreans to travel abroad, and for a youthful Korean 
diaspora –Seo Taiji among them, though not salmon pink as the colloquial term, 
yŏnŏjok, might apply – to return. The increased knowledge and awareness about the 
world outside altered and broadened the sources of information from, for example, 
AFKN and still-banned Japanese imports, and brought the challenges of competing in 
the international marketplace into sharper relief. But, it also challenged the 
conventions of the internal cultural economy.17  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  As already noted, the domestic music industry remained small to this point, licensing and 
producing local copies of European and American pop and classical music, submitting 
each release for scrutiny to the Ministry of Culture and Information. Censorship had 
banned 659 pop songs between 1965 and 1981, largely due to lyrics, but also because of 
artwork (The Beatles’ “Sergeant Peppers Lonely Hearts Club Band” was banned because 
the cover featured a tiny, smaller-than-a-postage-stamp, depiction of Marx sitting amongst 
the assembly of musicians), or morality. Note, too, that the domestic market never warmed 
to singles: they were costly to press and could never sell enough copies, so albums, 
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 The Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan eras saw the rise of student 
activism, promoted not least through the minjung munhwa popular cultural 
consciousness movement. By the end of the 1980s, former activists had become 
established members of the cultural industries, whether as directors and managers or 
as journalists and writers. As students, many had been involved in, say, the “song 
movement” (norae undong) or in producing traditionesque plays, madang kŭk. As 
they sought to challenge the conventions of cultural production, so they found a 
highly skilled and creative workforce that reflected, in education and training, the 
centralized drive fostered since the 1960s to develop industry and the economy in a 
way that promoted exports and restricted imports. In the literature on Korean Wave, 
the postcolonial camp can be identified as something coming out of this; nationalism 
required much cultural production to be identified as Korean. Internationalization 
might appear on the surface to require the opposite, but if the theories of glocalization 
and reterritorialization are applied, it is ultimately closely related to nationalism.  
 The move to know more about the world benefited from a further, external, 
development: satellite broadcasting. Satellites, and, during the 1990s, cable 
broadcasting, were particularly important for Korean pop, since they brought music 
videos to Korea, challenging the static studio-based pop show monopoly of Korea’s 
terrestrial broadcasters. I recall how satellite receivers began to appear on Seoul’s 
rooftops in 1990, within a few months of NHK launching its satellite channels. They 
were technically illegal at the time. Elsewhere in East Asia, 1990 had seen the 
establishment of Star TV by Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka Shing. A year later, Star 
formed a partnership with MTV that essentially brought music television to Asia. 
Satellite broadcasters needed pop stars to add visual dimensions to their performance, 
and if Seo Taiji in 1992 provided this through dance and costume, then Kim Gun 
Mo’s “P’inggye/Excuse” in 1993 came with what is often claimed to have been the 
first Korean music video – filmed in Jamaica and featuring a dance duo that would 
later be called CLON. 18  In Korea, satellites proved less important than cable 
television, and the country’s first cable music channel, M-Net, founded in 1993, held 
Korea’s first VJ (video jockey) contest in 1994, and began commercial cable 
broadcasts 16-hours daily on Channel 27 in March 1995. M-Net soon broadcast five 
daily hours of MTV. Backtracking slightly, Star and MTV had cancelled their 
collaboration in 1994. MTV established its Asian headquarters in Singapore while 
Star TV developed its own music television, Channel [V]. Channel [V] pioneered 
local marketing, providing Chinese and later Korean pop to East Asia but Indian pop 
to India – the global with the local. 
 Korean pop adapted to this new format quickly, and in so doing, the music 
industry briefly basked in the popularity of new pop in all its diversity. It played 
catch-up and, although on a smaller scale, began to resemble European and American 
“majors” in its operational components. However, satellite and cable music 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
although more difficult to promote on radio or in television shows, were the staple product. 
Where 1987 saw the first local distribution of jazz and ambient music on the ECM and 
Wyndham Hill labels, material that had formerly been largely unknown, it was only in the 
1990s that foreign music companies attempted to plant themselves on Korean territory. 
And, their initial forays were short-lived, due to the economic crisis in late 1997. 
18  At the time, the duo was known as Hyun Jin Young and Wawa. The name change to 
CLON came in 1996, when they were managed by Kim Ch’anghwan. 
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broadcasting began to shift pop away from the production of CDs and cassettes, from 
the aural to the visual.19 This sowed the seeds of the recorded music industry’s 
destruction, seeds that multiplied as the Internet spread. Music videos called for dance 
and, later, dramatic episodes, while the music itself lost its central importance.20 This 
was starkly illustrated in 1996, the year Seo Taiji and Boys disbanded, when CLON, 
the dance duo featured in “P’inggye/Excuse”, won a contest that came with a 
recording contract. The duo, Won Rae and Jun Yup, had already spent almost a 
decade as professional dancers, but now they had to be singers. In Korea they teamed 
up with others to bolster their somewhat challenged vocal abilities, in particular with 
the rock singer Kim Tae Young for their third album. Abroad, in 1999, Jun Yup 
famously sang a duet, “Can’t Wait”, with the Taiwanese singer Yuki Hsu.21 And with 
this, although the hallyu term is associated more with China and the reception of 
H.O.T. in the same year, Korean Wave had arrived.  
 A final, vital, part of the jigsaw must be added: the emergence of SM 
Entertainment and the other Korean music/media companies. By the new millennium, 
these were no longer playing catch-up with the music industry abroad, but, rather, 
allowed Korea to leap-frog forward. Before the European and American “majors” 
rolled-out 360-degree contracts to counter the decline in sales of pop music 
recordings, Korea initiated practices that would take music further away from the 
traditional recording industry, developing models of training, made-for-measure 
bands, and control over every aspect of a pop star’s life and image. If the foundations 
of Korean Wave are about appropriation, then SM Entertainment and its compatriots 
discovered greater innovation. Korean Wave thus managed to render the inherited 
literature on the music industry redundant – including the Internet/ISP vision of the 
still widely-cited futurists David Kusek and Gerd Leonhard (2005). In doing so, we 
have been challenged, even though, and as will have been obvious throughout this 
paper, we have remained largely reliant on familiar theories. Is any single theory 
adequate, whether “deterritorialization” or “reterritorialization”, “hybridity”, 
“transregionalism” or “glocalization”? In the next two days, this congress of the 
World Association for Hallyu Studies gives us the opportunity to discuss, explore and, 
hopefully, move our understandings forward.  
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